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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 1
CASE DIGESTS
FEDERAL CONTRACTS; State Law Applicable
Defendant, a married woman, executed a note for a loan from
the Small Business Administration. The federal government sued
on the note, and the defendant pleaded the Texas rule that a
married woman can not be held upon a contract. The district
court held that the state law applied and sustained the defense.
Held: Judgment affirmed. The state law of contracts applies
even to contracts with the federal government. Dissent: A loan
from the federal government is a federal matter and should be
governed by federal law. United States v. Yazeli, 334 F.2d 454
(2d Cir. 1964).
FurL FAITH AND CREDIT; Jurisdiction Over Real Property
Petitioner brought a quiet title action in Nebraska involving
land affected by a change in the course of the Missouri River.
The respondent appeared, challenged the jurisdiction of the Ne-
braska court and fully litigated that issue. The Nebraska court,
in ruling for petitioner, held that the land belonged to Nebraska,
and that it had jurisdiction. Two months later, the respondent
brought suit in a Missouri court to quiet title to the same land,
alleging that the land belonged to Missouri. The action was re-
moved to the federal district court, which held that the respondent
was barred by res judicata. The court of appeals reversed. Held:
Judgment of district court affirmed, reversing the court of appeals.
The Court's ruling that res judicata barred respondent's second suit
made applicable to jurisdiction over real property the general
rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit even as to
questions of jurisdiction when the second court inquiry discloses
that those questions had been fully and fairly litigated and finally
decided in the court which rendered the original judgment. The
Court noted, however, that this did not bind either state as to the
boundary between them. Mr. Justice Black concurred, with the
understanding that the Court did not decide whether respondent
would continue to be barred if the two states, either in court or by
agreement, subsequently decided the land actually belonged to
Missouri. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
LANDLORD AND TENANT; Covenant to Repair; Liability
Plaintiff leased a house from the defendant under an agree-
ment whereby the defendant agreed to keep the premises in repair.
During the tenancy, the gutters and downspouts became defective,
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allowing water to fall from the roof and collect and freeze on a
concrete walk. The defendant, although notified of the defect by
plaintiff, failed to make the necessary repairs. Subsequently, the
plaintiff slipped on the ice which had collected because of the
defect and was injured. A jury verdict was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff. Held: Judgment affirmed. The court held that,
although jurisdictions are equally split on whether a landlord may
be liable for personal injuries caused by an unreasonable risk
resulting from a breach of a covenant to repair, the better rule
is to allow recovery. In doing so, the court adopted the rule an-
nounced in section 357 of the Restatement of Torts. Dissent:
Liability for personal injuries was not within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of the making of the covenant to repair.
Zuroski v. Strickland, 176 Neb. 633, 126 N.W.2d 888 (1964).
PARENT Am CmILD; Child Custody; Religious Factor
The mother, a professed agnostic, sued the father, a person
active in church affairs, for custody of their child. The trial judge
found that both parents were fit and proper persons to have custo-
dy of the child but that a home in which a firm faith in the deity is
professed is preferable to one in which doubt, skepticism or ag-
nosticism is professed, and thus awarded custody to the father.
Held: Judgment reversed. The religious attitudes of either parent
are irrelevant in determining who shall have custody of a child
as long as those attitudes can not reasonably be considered dan-
gerous to the child's health or morals. Such a case might be pre-
sented, said the court, where a parent's religious beliefs would
prevent a child's receiving blood transfusions. The fact that the
mother was an agnostic did not override the preference in favor
of the mother in custody cases. Welker v. Welker, - Wis. -,
129 N.W.2d 134 (1964).
SERVICE OF PROCESS; Designated Agent
Respondent, a farmer residing in Michigan, leased farm equip-
ment from petitioner, a corporation operating in New York, and
signed petitioner's printed form lease. One of the provisions of
the lease stated that "the Lessee hereby designates Florence Wein-
berg ... as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any
process within the State of New York." Florence Weinberg was
not known to respondent but was related to an officer in petitioner
corporation. Petitioner sued respondent for overdue payments
and summons was served on Weinberg, who in turn notified re-
spondent. Respondent maintained that the service was invalid;
petitioner contended it was valid under Rule 4(d) (1) of the Fed-
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing service on authorized
agents. The district court quashed the summons and the court of
appeals affirmed. Held: Judgment reversed. A party to a private
contract may appoint an agent to receive service of process within
the meaning of Rule 4 (d) (1) even though the agent is not per-
sonally known to the party and the agent has not expressly under-
taken to transmit notice to the party. The Court suggested that
if Weinberg had not notified respondent the agency would have
been invalidated. National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375
U.S. 311 (1964).
SUBSCRIPTIONS; Compliance with Expressed Purpose
Defendant charity in 1951 solicited by subscription funds for
acquiring a site and erecting a new building. Plaintiff's testator
pledged and paid $1000 toward this fund. In 1956 the defendant
resolved not to rebuild but to apply the fund toward maintenance
of the old building and establishment of a parochial mission.
Plaintiff, as executor of his testator's estate, requested return of
the $1000 and was refused. The district court held for the defend-
ant. Held: Judgment reversed. If a charity raises funds by sub-
scription for a particular purpose and subsequently abandons that
purpose, the donors may reclaim their contributions in an action
at law for money had and received. Barker v. Wardens & Vestry-
men of Saint Barnabas Church, 176 Neb. 327, 126 N.W.2d 170
(1964).
TAXATION; Recovery of Penalty
Plaintiffs sought to recover invalidly assessed property tax
penalties under section 77-1735 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes,
which allows such a suit to recover an invalid "tax." The defend-
ant, treasurer of the City of Lincoln, argued that although the
statute provided a remedy for recovery of taxes, it did not apply
to recovery of penalties, and relied on earlier cases holding that
penalties were not a part of the tax within the meaning of Article
VIII, section 4 of the Nebraska Constitution, prohibiting legisla-
tive remission of taxes. The district court dismissed the action.
Held: Judgment reversed. Although a penalty is not part of the
tax within the meaning of the Nebraska Constitution preventing
their remission, such penalties have some of the attributes of the
tax with respect to their distribution. The action should be al-
lowed. Misle v. Miller, 176 Neb. 113, 125 N.W.2d 512 (1963).
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WORKMEN'S COMENSATION; "Employee" defined
The decedent was a member and stockholder of a golf club
which passed a resolution whereby each member was assessed five
hours of labor on the course or, in the alternative, $5.00. The
decedent chose the former and was killed while thus employed.
The decedent's claimant contended that the decedent was an "em-
ployee" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act
and entitled to compensation. The Industrial Commission held
for the claimant and was reversed by the district court. Held:
Judgment of district court reversed, and findings of Industrial
Commission affirmed. The Iowa court said that since the resolu-
tion and other evidence illustrated that its provisions were manda-
tory and not voluntarily assumed, the decedent was an "employee"
and thus entitled to compensation. Usgaard v. Silver Crest Golf
Club, __ Iowa __, 127 N.W.2d 636 (1964).
